Tenant’s housing standards claim dismissed; her bed bug claim under tenancy law continues (SACAT, 2026)

What happened

The tenant rents a home from the South Australian Housing Trust, which is the state's public housing landlord. The home has a bed bug infestation. Nobody disputed that the infestation exists. The tenant said the Trust had not dealt with it properly, either at her home or at the attached neighbouring home, which the Trust also owns and rents out. She said bed bugs kept coming back from next door.

The tenant said she had lost money, lost the use and enjoyment of her home, and suffered loss of amenity and inconvenience. She filed a claim, then amended it twice, with the final version filed on 17 June 2026. That final version relied on two laws: section 34(2)(a) of the Housing Improvement Act 2016, which says a landlord must take reasonable steps to make sure rented premises are, and stay, safe and suitable for people to live in; and section 65(1)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995, which makes it a term of every tenancy that the landlord will take reasonable steps to stop its other tenants in neighbouring premises interfering with the tenant's reasonable peace, comfort or privacy.

Both sides had lawyers. At a directions hearing on 23 April 2026 the Trust raised a concern about whether the tribunal could deal with the Housing Improvement Act part of the claim at all. The tribunal directed both sides to file written arguments on that question and decided it "on the papers", meaning from the documents rather than at a hearing. The Trust filed its submissions on 4 May 2026 and the tenant filed hers on 8 May 2026.

The Trust did not file a formal application to dismiss, but the tribunal treated its submissions as one, using its own power to dismiss a proceeding on its own initiative under section 48 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.

What each side wanted

The tenant asked for three kinds of relief: orders requiring the Trust to engage a contractor to inspect both homes and produce a written eradication and management plan covering treatment method, any structural or harbourage reduction work, cleaning of linen and soft furnishings and a monitoring schedule, then implement that plan, take all reasonable steps to get access to the neighbouring home so a coordinated plan could actually be finished, and finally give her a written statement from the contractor that both homes were as far as reasonably practicable free of bed bug activity; compensation of $10,417.90, or another figure the tribunal decided, for loss of amenity, remedial labour and replacing possessions; or alternatively a change to her tenancy agreement to reduce her rent. The Trust argued that the Housing Improvement Act part of the claim had to be dismissed because the tenant had no standing and no statutory entitlement to a remedy under that Act, so the tribunal had no power to grant what she asked for. It also argued, briefly, that section 34(5) of that Act rules out civil or criminal liability for a breach of the general duty on its own.

What the tribunal decided

The tribunal dismissed the part of the proceedings that alleged the Trust had breached section 34 of the Housing Improvement Act 2016. It adjourned the matter to a further directions hearing on a date to be set.

No money was ordered to be paid to anyone. The tenant's claim under section 65(1)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995, on the same or similar facts, was not dismissed and can still be run; the tribunal said its merits will be a matter of evidence and argument.

Two things were left open. First, costs: the tribunal noted that section 57(3) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 and regulation 7(b) of the 2015 regulations mean it should now make a costs order against the tenant unless there is good reason not to, and said it would hear from the parties on that. Second, the eradication plan orders: the tribunal set out a preliminary view that it may have no power to make them, but deferred deciding so both sides could put submissions on that point first.

Why the tribunal decided it that way

The tribunal did not accept the Trust's main argument. It found the Trust had misunderstood the tenant's case, treating it as a complaint about section 34(1) (the duty on an owner) when she was relying on section 34(2) (the duty on a landlord). The tribunal accepted that the tenant did have standing. Section 35 of the Housing Improvement Act gives the tribunal power over a "housing improvement tenancy dispute", which is defined to include a dispute between parties to a residential tenancy agreement about matters arising under that Act, and section 38 lists broad powers including requiring a person to comply with an obligation, ordering a payment, and reducing rent.

The claim still failed, for a different reason. Section 34(5) of the Housing Improvement Act says a person who breaches section 34 is not, on account of the breach alone, liable to any civil or criminal action. The tenant argued that a tribunal claim under Part 5 of that Act was not a "civil action" in that sense, because the tribunal's powers are statutory or administrative. The tribunal disagreed. A dispute between a landlord and a tenant about their private rights is a civil action, and it is no less a civil action because Parliament created the right by statute. Remedies like compensation, injunctions and specific performance are the ordinary remedies of civil actions. So even if the tenant proved every fact, the Trust would have a complete defence, and the claim was futile. The tribunal read the purpose of section 34(5) as preventing the same facts being litigated twice: a tenant can still sue under the Residential Tenancies Act, or in contract or tort where that Act does not apply, but cannot add a breach of section 34 as a separate cause of action. Section 34(7), which preserves other actions under the Act such as a restraining order under section 39, was not read as giving back what section 34(5) takes away.

Because the defect was in the case itself and not in how it was written, and could not be fixed by amending the documents, the tribunal exercised its discretion under section 48(2) to dismiss the claim as misconceived or lacking in substance. It noted that summary dismissal is a serious step, that the test is onerous, and that a case must be unarguable before it is dismissed, but held that letting the parties continue with a claim that could not possibly succeed was not in the interests of justice and was a burden on the respondent. It also considered it was fair to rely on section 34(5) even though the Trust had barely argued it, because the tenant had already given lengthy submissions on how that subsection should be read.

On the eradication plan orders, the tribunal observed that they are mandatory injunctions, that is, orders requiring someone to do something rather than stop doing something. Section 7(2) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1992 says a mandatory injunction cannot be granted against the Crown, and "Crown" includes an instrumentality or agency of the Crown. The tribunal set out why the Trust appears to be an instrumentality of the Crown, including that it carries out a government purpose, is subject to its Minister's direction, is managed by a board appointed by the Governor, holds property on behalf of the Crown and reports to Parliament. If that is right, the tribunal has no power to make mandatory orders against the Trust under either Act. The tribunal stopped short of ruling on that, because neither side had argued it.

What this means if you are in a similar position

If you are in a similar position, this decision shows that the law a claim is built on matters as much as the facts. The infestation here was not in dispute, and the tenant was found to have standing, but one of the two laws she relied on contains a subsection saying a breach of that duty on its own does not make anyone liable to a civil claim. A tribunal can dismiss a claim that cannot succeed as a matter of law without ever hearing the evidence about what happened in the home.

It also shows that the tenancy legislation did the work here. The tenant's claim that her landlord failed to take reasonable steps to stop a neighbouring tenant interfering with her peace and comfort, under section 65(1)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995, survived and still has to be decided on the evidence. And it shows that who the landlord is can change what orders are available: when the landlord is a government body, a statute may prevent the tribunal from ordering it to carry out particular works, even where the same order could be made against a private landlord. A dismissal can also carry a costs risk, which the tribunal here left to be argued.

In this kind of dispute, most people start by putting the problem in writing to the landlord or agent: a notice that sets out what is wrong, what has been reported before, what they are asking to be fixed and by when. That written record is what later supports an application to the tribunal if the problem is not fixed.

How to apply: our step-by-step guide to a SACAT application. More decisions: SACAT cases and house rentals and bonds.

Source: Rondeau v South Australian Housing Trust [2026] SACAT 64 (read the full decision). This summary was prepared from the published decision for general information. It is not legal advice, and the tribunal’s own reasons are the authoritative record.