Owner’s eviction case fails because her husband, not her, was the landlord on the lease (NCAT, 2026)

What happened

The owner had held the property, a unit at North Steyne, since 2013. It was managed from 2014 by Manly Shores Property Group Pty Ltd under a management agency agreement. The owner said she was often overseas, so she authorised her husband to deal with the managing agent on her behalf in all aspects of managing the property. The property had mostly been used as short-term holiday accommodation, with longer residential letting during and after the pandemic.

In July 2023 the tenant signed a Residential Tenancy Agreement for the premises. That agreement was expressed to be between the owner's husband as landlord and the tenant as tenant, with Manly Shores Property Group named as the landlord's agent. The owner was not named as the landlord or as a party. Clause 1 of the agreement said the landlord agreed the tenant had the right to occupy the premises during the tenancy.

In September 2025 the owner instructed the agent to end the tenancy and return the property to holiday rental use. A termination notice dated 10 September 2025 required vacant possession (handing the property back empty) by 12 December 2025. It was issued under s 87L of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW), the ground that premises are no longer to be used as rented residential premises, and the owner gave evidence that she issued it as owner. Registration of the property for short-term rental accommodation was attached to her later application.

The tenant did not vacate. In January 2026 the owner applied to NCAT for a termination order and possession. At the hearing on 26 June 2026 both sides appeared for themselves, and the owner's request to be legally represented was refused. The Tribunal found the tenancy agreement was between the husband as landlord and the tenant, that owning the property did not by itself make the owner the landlord, and that she therefore had no standing. It dismissed the application, and added that even if the husband had been the applicant the termination notice would not have been valid under s 87L because the owner, not the landlord, had issued it.

What each side wanted

On appeal, the owner argued four errors of law. She said the definition of "landlord" in s 3 of the Act looks at who in substance granted the right to occupy, not at whose name appears on the written agreement, and that the Tribunal had asked the wrong question. She relied on agency and the doctrine of the undisclosed principal: her husband had her authority and no interest of his own in the property, so the agreement was in substance hers; alternatively, the managing agent signed under authority she had given, so the grant of occupation was made on her behalf. She said the affidavits, the management agency agreement, the emails with the agent and her oral evidence all supported a finding that she was the landlord, that she therefore had standing, and that the findings about the termination notice were affected by the same error. She also asked that her husband be joined to the appeal and that the Appeal Panel declare her the landlord, terminate the tenancy and order possession. The tenant, who represented herself, supported the original decision and had argued below that the notice was invalid because it was not issued by the person named as landlord in the agreement.

What the tribunal decided

The Appeal Panel made one order: "The appeal is dismissed." No money was ordered to be paid by either side, and no date for possession was set.

The effect is that the first decision stands. The owner's application for termination and possession remains dismissed, and the tenancy was not ended by these proceedings.

Why the tribunal decided it that way

An internal appeal at NCAT is not a second chance to run the case. Under s 80(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) a party can appeal as of right only on a question of law, and otherwise needs the Appeal Panel's permission. The Panel accepted that each ground here did raise a question of law, including how the definition of "landlord" should be read, whether there was any evidence to support the finding, and whether the Tribunal had the jurisdiction (legal power) to decide the case at all.

The definition of "landlord" in s 3 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) covers the person who grants the right to occupy the premises under a residential tenancy agreement, a successor in title, or a tenant who has sublet. The Panel noted that nothing in the definition requires the landlord to be the owner: part (c) shows a tenant can be a landlord to a sub-tenant. The focus is on who occupies the role of landlord in the relationship with that tenant, and the prescribed form of agreement works the same way, giving the named landlord rights and duties owed directly to the tenant, so the tenant knows who to deal with and who to enforce against.

On the facts, the agreement named the husband as landlord, clause 1 attributed the grant of occupation to the landlord rather than to the managing agent, and the owner's own evidence was that her husband acted with her authority and was her point of contact with the agent. She never said he acted without authority. The Panel held that this evidence supported the finding that the husband, with the owner's approval, was the person who granted the tenant the right to occupy, and that the Tribunal had not treated ownership or the paperwork alone as decisive. Reading the Act as the owner urged would mean the tenant's landlord was someone other than the person named in the agreement and other than the person they dealt with, which does not fit the scheme. The English case the owner relied on, Epps v Rothnie, was about a different statute for a different purpose, and the meaning of "landlord" here had to come from the text, context and purpose of this Act, with s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) favouring a reading that promotes the Act's purpose.

Because the owner was not the landlord, she could not apply under s 89A for a termination order, so the Tribunal never had power to decide her application. That made the remaining grounds about the validity of the s 87L notice unnecessary to decide, and the Panel expressly left open whether the original Tribunal's alternative reasoning on the notice was right.

What this means if you are in a similar position

If you are in a similar position, this decision shows how strictly NCAT reads the word "landlord" in residential tenancy cases. Being the registered owner of the property, paying the rates and giving the instructions is not the same as being the landlord under the Act. The person who holds that role is the one shown as landlord in the tenancy agreement and who granted the tenant the right to occupy. Only that person (or a successor in title, or a head tenant who has sublet) can give a termination notice and apply for a termination order, and the Tribunal has no power to decide an application brought by someone who does not hold that role.

It also shows that a family arrangement does not fix the problem. The owner's point that her husband acted only as her agent, and was named as landlord "in error", did not help her; if anything her evidence that he acted with her authority supported the finding that he was the landlord in the relationship with the tenant. Nor did the fact that the managing agent signed under her management agreement, because the agent was acting in a representative capacity for the named landlord. Where the names on the agreement, the notice and the application do not line up, a standing problem can end the case before the merits are ever looked at.

In a tenancy dispute like this, most people start with written notice to the other side, given by the person named in the agreement and setting out the ground relied on and the date required, before any application is lodged with the tribunal.

How to apply: our step-by-step guide to a NCAT application. More decisions: NCAT cases and house rentals and bonds.

Source: Becaus v Ayo [2026] NSWCATAP 330 (read the full decision). This summary was prepared from the published decision for general information. It is not legal advice, and the tribunal’s own reasons are the authoritative record.