Discrimination claim over medical records given to a parent dismissed as misconceived (SACAT, 2026)

What happened

The applicant and her mother saw a doctor on 6 November 2025. The purpose was to have the doctor complete paperwork so the mother could apply to Centrelink for a Carer Payment or Allowance for the care she gave her daughter. The doctor added and amended information on the partly completed form using the clinic's electronic clinical records.

A second appointment was made in December 2025 to progress the paperwork, because Centrelink had asked for more information. The text is not clear whether that appointment was on 10 or 11 December, and the Tribunal said so. The applicant did not attend. Her mother did, and asked the doctor for documentary evidence of her daughter's diagnosis to support the Centrelink application. The doctor accessed the applicant's health record, printed a hospital discharge summary and gave it to the mother.

The applicant complained to the clinic in writing in December 2025 and received a response and an oral apology the same day, then a written letter of apology from the doctor on 18 December 2025. She considered the apology inadequate because it did not acknowledge why the events had happened. She said the released material included information her mother had not previously known, and the doctor accepted this had caused disruption in the family and damaged her relationship with her mother.

She complained to the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity on 19 December 2025. The Commissioner declined the complaint on 28 January 2026 under s 95A(1)(a) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 as lacking in substance, saying there was not a sufficient causal link between the applicant's disabilities and the treatment complained of. At the applicant's request the Commissioner referred the complaint to the Tribunal. The applicant did not attend a conciliation conference (she was ill and later provided medical documentation) or a directions hearing on 1 May 2026, but she did file the written submissions the Tribunal directed her to provide.

What each side wanted

The applicant said she had been directly discriminated against on the ground of disability in the supply of goods and services, contrary to ss 66 and 76 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984, and that she had received "substandard medical services based on less favourable terms due to disability". She argued that the doctor's assumption of her consent was "a stereotypical judgment tied directly to my disability", that a 19-year-old patient without documented psychiatric disabilities would not have had their autonomy bypassed in the same way, and that the privacy breach "was driven by discrimination". She also said she had been victimised by being denied a fair internal review and by an apology that, in her words, treated a legitimate complaint as a symptom of a mental health condition. The doctor accepted that the applicant has a disability within the meaning of the Act and that he provides medical services, but applied on 15 May 2026 to have the matter struck out as misconceived or lacking in substance under s 48(1)(a) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, arguing she had identified no proper comparator, no particulars of substandard service, no evidence the treatment was because of her disability, and no service supplied to her at the second appointment, and that the privacy and consent issues were outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction in this case.

What the tribunal decided

The Tribunal decided the interlocutory application on the papers, taking into account the written submissions of both sides, including the applicant's earlier undated submission and her submission of 8 May 2026.

The order made was short: "These proceedings are dismissed." The dismissal was made under s 48 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, on the basis that the proceedings were misconceived and lacking in substance in respect of the Equal Opportunity Act. No money was ordered to be paid by either side, and the text records no costs order.

The Tribunal expressly did not decide whether the events happened as the applicant described them. It took her account at face value and found that, even if she proved it all, the account would not establish unlawful discrimination under the Act.

Why the tribunal decided it that way

Section 66(a) of the Equal Opportunity Act says a person discriminates on the ground of disability if they treat another unfavourably because of that person's disability. Section 76 makes that unlawful in one particular setting: offering or providing goods or services, either by refusing or failing to supply them, or in the terms, conditions or manner in which they are supplied. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant has a disability and that medical services are "services" under the Act (s 4 includes services of a profession or trade). That left two things she had to show: that any unfavourable treatment happened because of her disability, and that it happened in the provision of services to her.

On the first, the Tribunal said a "comparator" is needed – a comparison with how someone in the same circumstances but without a disability would have been treated. The applicant's comparator, a 19-year-old patient without disabilities, was not an adequate one, because the comparison has to be with a patient presenting in the same way and seeking the same services, including the Centrelink carer paperwork. She offered nothing beyond her own assertion and subjective belief that such a person would have been treated differently.

On the second, the applicant did not attend the December appointment. The Tribunal found there was nothing to suggest the doctor provided any service to her at that consultation: she was not there, and the information, whether properly released or not, supported her mother's Centrelink application, so the service was provided to the mother. The claim that the doctor had failed to give her the records at the 6 November appointment was not enough to show a refusal to provide a service, particularly as the doctor had no memory of being asked and the second appointment was arranged because Centrelink wanted more material.

Victimisation under s 86 of the Act is a narrow thing: unfavourable treatment because a person has brought proceedings, given evidence, made allegations or otherwise acted under that Act. Every act the applicant complained of, including the apology of 18 December 2025, happened before she complained to the Commissioner on 19 December 2025, and she had framed her concerns at that stage as a breach of privacy. The Tribunal also noted victimisation was not part of the complaint the Commissioner referred. Under s 48(1)(a) of the SACAT Act, a proceeding may be dismissed if it is misconceived or lacking in substance. Relying on BKM & SEU v Department for Child Protection [2020] SACAT 16 and Adelaide Oval Management Authority v Valuer-General [2022] SACAT 33, the Tribunal said "misconceived" means built on a plainly wrong understanding so that there is no real basis for the case to proceed, "lacking in substance" means an untenable proposition of law or fact, and that summary dismissal must be approached cautiously because it removes a party's right to run their case. It weighed that right against the cost, time and reputational prejudice to the doctor and the Tribunal's own objectives under s 8 of resolving matters quickly, cheaply and justly, and concluded both limbs applied. The Tribunal also noted that concerns about the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the Australian Privacy Principles were, in themselves, irrelevant to the operation of the Equal Opportunity Act.

What this means if you are in a similar position

If you are in a similar position, this decision shows how narrowly discrimination law is read. Equal opportunity legislation does not make every unfair, upsetting or even unlawful act a case of discrimination. It covers particular grounds, such as disability, in particular settings, such as the supply of goods and services, and each element has to be met. A genuine grievance about consent or privacy can be real and still sit entirely outside that Act, as the Tribunal found here.

The decision also shows what the "because of" element means in practice. It is not enough to say that the same thing would not have happened to someone without a disability. The comparison has to be with a person in the same situation, seeking the same thing, and there has to be something pointing to the disability as the reason. A sincere belief, without more, did not get the complaint past the first hurdle. And where the service was provided to someone else, in the applicant's absence, the Tribunal found it was not a service provided to her at all.

It is also a reminder that a case can be ended before any evidence is heard. A tribunal can dismiss a proceeding as misconceived or lacking in substance if, taking the facts as alleged, they still do not amount to a breach of the law relied on. In disputes about how a clinic, business or agency handled personal information, most people start with a written complaint to the organisation setting out what happened and what they want done, and then escalate to the relevant regulator or tribunal if that does not resolve it.

How to apply: our step-by-step guide to a SACAT application. More decisions: SACAT cases and other civil disputes.

Source: IGM v AVH [2026] SACAT 57 (read the full decision). This summary was prepared from the published decision for general information. It is not legal advice, and the tribunal’s own reasons are the authoritative record.